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I. INTRODUCTION
I take it that my principal qualification for being asked to participate
in the workshop that gave rise to this paper is that I published an article,
Jobs, Qualifications, and Preferences (JQP) in 1983, in which I
discussed an issue that had not received sufficient attention.1 Arguments
for affirmative action frequently appealed to the social and psychological
advantages that would accrue from greater racial and sexual diversity,
with the “role modeling” effect being top on the list. These were not
arguments for preferential treatment, properly understood, but were
instead arguments for broadening our conception of the job itself and,
* Visiting Scholar, Department of Clinical Bioethics, National Institutes of
Health. Professor Emeritus of Political Science, University of Vermont.
1. Alan Wertheimer, Jobs, Qualifications, and Preferences, 94 ETHICS 99 (1983).
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therefore, what counts as a qualification for a job. On this view, a
woman mathematics professor who could serve as a role model for
female students might actually be more qualified than an otherwise
better qualified male, if encouraging female students to pursue math
were regarded as one of the qualifications for the job. It did not take a
genius to see that this line of argument had potentially disturbing
implications. For if being a member of a historically oppressed or
disadvantaged group could be an asset in certain jobs, it could also be a
liability.
For example, and as an empirical matter, it is possible that students
will learn less from an otherwise better qualified female mathematics
professor than a lesser qualified male because they do not take a female
mathematics professor seriously. Moreover, this was not a small
problem. For as soon as one begins to think about the characteristics of
jobs, it becomes quite apparent that success in many jobs turns on the
reactions of customers (clients, students, targets) or coworkers to the
behavior and characteristics of an employee, and so we need to determine
when such reactions count as bona fide occupational qualifications and
when they do not.
Intuitively, it seems that it is sometimes legitimate to count what I
called “reaction qualifications” (to use an unattractive expression) and
sometimes not. In Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.2 the Fifth
Circuit considered whether Pan American’s policy of hiring only
females as flight attendants was a form of illegal discrimination, even if
it were a wise business decision given the preferences of its customers,
most of whom were male.3 The court said “it would be totally
anomalous if we were to allow the preferences and prejudices of the
customers to determine whether the sex discrimination was valid.
Indeed, it was, to a large extent, these very prejudices that [Title VII of
the 1965 Civil Rights Act] was meant to overcome.”4 Although the
Fifth Circuit seemed to think it is easy to determine what counts as the
sort of prejudice the Act was meant to overcome and those reactions
which can legitimately be counted, I thought then and continue to think
that this is much more difficult than is often supposed. Although I made
some suggestions as to how we might distinguish between those cases,
my answers were messy and unsatisfactory. Moreover, I now think that
the case for counting arguably illegitimate reactions is somewhat stronger
than I once thought.

2.
3.
4.
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Although my desire to participate in Professor Alexander’s workshop
was sufficient to motivate my acceptance of his invitation, the fact is that
I have not written a word about these issues since the early 1980s. And
while I did take this occasion to read some of the legal scholarship on
the issue, particularly the scholarship produced by some of those in
attendance at this workshop, I have not kept up with what is now an
enormous body of literature. With these preemptive strikes being launched,
my plan is to offer some reflections—not a sustained and well-integrated
argument—on the themes of the conference and on some arguments
advanced by Professors Kelman and Yuracko, who have produced some
of the most important scholarship on the topic.5 I will also offer some
updated reflections on reaction qualifications and the arguments for
“laundering preferences” in formulating social policy.
In the background are two claims that I want to put on the table. First,
although it may be wrong for people to engage in a particular form of
discrimination, it does not follow that the government should seek to
prevent that discrimination. Second, although it may not be wrong for
people to engage in a particular form of discrimination, it does not
follow that it would be wrong for the government to seek to prevent that
discrimination or to mitigate its effects. The wrongness of individual
behavior is obviously related to the justifiability of state action, but the
correlation is by no means perfect.
II. DISCRIMINATION
A. The Rhetoric of Discrimination
The rhetoric of discrimination is still powerful. Although scholars
understand the distinction between the descriptive and neutral sense of
discrimination, under which to discriminate is simply to make distinctions,
and the morally loaded sense of discrimination, the word continues to be
a conversation stopper. To label a form of distinction-making as
discrimination is to say that it is wrong and seems to require the
distinction-maker to defend his practice. If we think it is seriously
wrong not to build ramps for the disabled, we refer to it as
discrimination. If we are less adamant, we may ask whether we should
5. See Mark Kelman, Defining the Antidiscrimination Norm to Defend It, 43 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 735 (2006); Kim Yuracko, Sameness, Subordination, and Perfectionism,
43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 857 (2006).
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provide accommodations to the handicapped. In my view, nothing turns
on the label. The question is whether we should build ramps, not
whether not doing so is discrimination or nonaccommodation. If we
think that affirmative action or preferential treatment is wrong, we refer
to it as reverse discrimination. If we think that the use of proxies is
wrong, we refer to it as stereotyping or profiling or discrimination. No
one ever claims that law schools discriminate when they use college
grades in deciding whom to admit (although such claims are sometimes
made with respect to LSATs). If one wants to oppose the use of genetic
markers in setting insurance premiums, one refers to it as “genetic
discrimination.” We rarely say that it is permissible to “discriminate” on
the basis of race in choosing one’s friends or mates. We do not use the
word. And (virtually) no one says that heterosexuals and homosexuals
“discriminate” in their choice of sexual partners.
The invocation of the word discrimination seems to presuppose that
some decisionmaker is responsible for the resulting inequality of results.
No one says that we discriminate when we choose to watch male
basketball players or female ice skaters even if it turns out that the
aggregation of such preferences yield a pay structure in which male
basketball players earn more than female basketball players and female
professional ice skaters earn more than male professional ice skaters. By
contrast, it has been argued that Wimbledon discriminates against
women because the prize for winning the women’s championship is less
than the prize for the men.6 We do not regard it as wrong when market
forces produce higher income for some jobs than others or when market
forces add jobs in one sector and reduce jobs in another. Moreover,
whereas we worry about discrimination in hiring for jobs, we do not
worry as much if a job is not created, if there are few jobs for French
horn players but many more for violinists. Moreover, whereas we may
think it important not to discriminate when hiring for a job, we do not
view the practice of not firing as wrongful discrimination against the
more qualified unemployed, a phenomenon for which many college
professors are no doubt thankful.
B. What Makes Discrimination Wrong?
I believe that Larry Alexander’s article, What Makes Wrongful
Discrimination Wrong? Biases, Preferences, Stereotypes, and Proxies,
6. Associated Press, Men’s Winner Will Still Earn More Than Women’s (April
26, 2006), available at http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/print?id=2420833&type=story.
The French and U.S. Open offer equal prizes to both men and women singles champions.
See Mark Rice-Oxley, Venus Williams at Wimbledon: Show Women the Money,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Boston), June 29, 2006, at 1.
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was the first systematic attempt to grapple with the question it poses.7
Although we will return to his answer below, here I want to pursue his
question. When confronted with the question, “Why is it wrong to
discriminate on the basis of race or sex?,” many will respond that it is
wrong because a person has no control over those characteristics. It
does not take much to show that this cannot be the right answer. If
individual acts of discrimination are intrinsically wrong, it must be for
one of several reasons: (1) they fail to give people what they deserve;
(2) they violate the target’s rights; (3) they demean, stigmatize, or express
wrongful values towards the target; or (4) they fail to treat people on the
basis of the relevant criteria. If the wrongness of discrimination is not,
fundamentally, an intrinsic feature of each isolated act of discrimination,
then it must be a function of its consequences—either the consequences
of individual acts or the aggregate consequences of similar acts.
Let us consider these arguments in a bit more detail. Although it is
not incoherent to argue that a job should be awarded on the basis of
desert, and that we wrongfully discriminate when we do not do so, that
principle cannot be right unless we fudge the notion of desert. David
Miller says that a person “deserves a particular job when, as far as we
can determine, his or her performance in that job will be superior to that
of all the other applicants by virtue of his or her own personal qualities
and the legitimate reactions of others.”8 Thus, Miller would argue that if
a prospective black employee would perform less well than a white
person because of obstructive behavior by a supervisor or fellow
employees, it does not follow that he is less deserving—“the predictable
performance is not connected in the right kind of way to present facts
about the applicant.”9 Fair enough. But suppose that a law firm is
considering candidates, one of whom is a former high-ranking official in
the Department of Justice. He may be less talented than other applicants,
but the firm has reason to believe that his high profile will bring more
business. If the law firm can reasonably aim to maximize its profits
(rather than its legal talent), the former official may be the most
qualified person for the job, but it would be odd to say that he is most
deserving. We might wrongfully discriminate when we fail to award a

7. Larry Alexander, What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? Biases,
Preferences, Stereotypes, and Proxies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 149 (1992).
8. David Miller, Deserving Jobs, 42 PHIL. Q. 161, 175-76 (1992).
9. Id. at 175.
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job to the best qualified, but not because we fail to award a job to the
most “deserving.”
A rights based approach is not likely to prove more promising. If we
take a deontic approach to rights, then we need to determine just who
has what rights. A deontic right not to be discriminated against is
unlikely to be helpful because it requires us to determine what sorts of
discrimination constitute violations of rights and why they do so. If we
start with a deontic right of property and association such that an
employer has a fundamental right to do with his property what he
wishes, then an antidiscrimination argument cannot even get going. On
this view, when A chooses to hire B over C, that decision does not
violate any rights of C, for, as Koppelman puts (but does not endorse)
the argument, “[n]o one has a right to compel others to associate with
her.”10 Koppelman wrongly claims that this argument rests on a
“dubiously atomistic conception of human life.”11 After all, the point of
such a right is not to remain isolated, but to frame the way in which
people should be able to associate with each other. Neither Koppelman
nor I may like A’s reasons for associating with B rather than C, but it has
nothing to do with an atomistic conception of human life. Koppelman
may, however, be correct to argue that this approach wrongly assumes
that people have deontic property rights independent of the consequences of
their acknowledgement. He may be right to maintain that we need not
accept a regime of property rights that leaves the state powerless to assist
“a permanent outcast population in a state of chronic economic
misery. . . .”12 But that is just to adopt a consequentialist account of
rights, in which case we need to determine what regime of rights would
produce what sorts of consequences. From that perspective, it is an open
question as to what such a consequentialist account will yield with
respect to the right to hire and fire.
Some argue that the wrongfulness of discrimination is expressive, that
it is a way of demeaning, stigmatizing, or subordinating the target. On
this view, which is similar to the “speech act” view that Rae Langton has
taken with pornography, the wrongness of discrimination is not to be
found in the locutionary force of such acts or in its perlocutionary effects
on the target.13 Rather, it is to be found in its illocutionary force—what
it does. Now, I think there is a question as to just what the wrong of
10. Andrew Koppelman, Should Noncommercial Associations Have an Absolute
Right to Discriminate?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 27, 33 (2004).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. See Rae Langton, Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
293, 293, 305-08 (1993); Deborah Hellman, The Expressive Dimension of Equal
Protection, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1, 2 (2000).
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“demeaning” is. There is clearly a distinction between being demeaned
and feeling demeaned, where the former is neither necessary nor
sufficient for the latter. Suppose A spits on B, who appears to be a
homeless man but who is actually an undercover police officer. B may
regard A as a jerk or may even have sympathy with A’s action (had A
been correct about his target). Has A demeaned B? Has A unsuccessfully
attempted to demean B? More importantly, it seems that there are many
cases of alleged wrongful discrimination that have absolutely nothing to
do with demeaning or stigmatizing—at least as those terms are normally
understood. Many cases of alleged sexual discrimination are rooted in
positive preferences for interacting with, say, males or females and are
not based on animus or aversion at all. Consider discrimination in
insurance: if insurers are wrong to charge higher premiums to those who
are genetically disposed to be at high risk for a disease, it would be silly
to say that they are demeaning them or attempting to do so.
So we might say that the wrong of discrimination consists in not
treating people on the basis of the criteria on which we ought to treat
them. This account may point us in a certain direction, but, of course,
tells us virtually nothing as to what criteria are morally relevant or
permissible. Moreover, and perhaps more important, if this is the wrong
of discrimination, it is not clear just how wrong discrimination is. As
Richard Arneson suggests, we are unlikely to regard “whimsical” or
“idiosyncratic” hiring practices as seriously wrong because they are
unlikely to inflict a “significant psychic wound over and above the loss
This suggests that much of the wrongness of
of the job.”14
discrimination is likely to be found in the consequences of patterns of
discrimination and not, at least not principally, in a feature of an isolated
act.
C. How Wrong Is Discrimination?
In Exploitation, I argued that exploitation, as such, may be less wrong
than it is commonly thought to be. Because exploitation is often
harmful, we may incorrectly assume that exploitation is seriously wrong
when the exploitee is not harmed.15 Much the same may be true of
discrimination. In What Makes Discrimination Wrong?, Larry Alexander
14. Richard Arneson, Equality of Opportunity, in STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL.
(2006), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/achives/win2002/entries/equal-opportunity/.
15. ALAN WERTHMEIMER, EXPLOITATION, at ix (1996).
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asks us to assume that acts of discrimination occur within the framework
of an otherwise just society.16 For the sake of argument, assume something
like a Rawlsian view of a just basic structure. Let us assume that
everyone is granted equal basic liberties, that there is roughly fair
equality of opportunity, and that social and economic inequalities are in
accord with the difference principle or that society guaranteed an
adequate level of economic resources to all those who are able to work.
While people may be denied particular jobs or positions (say that men
are never or rarely hired as gynecologists), there are ample opportunities
for men and women, whites and persons of color, and so forth. Perhaps
Jews cannot join a particular golf club, but they are not denied the
opportunity to golf or practice their Judaism. Perhaps gay men will not
be chosen as Boy Scout leaders, but there are numerous positions open
to them. Some fraternities do not accept nerds or jocks or whites or
blacks, but there are ample options available to all. Would these forms
of discrimination be seriously wrong? I honestly do not know. I am
reasonably confident that our present intuitions about discrimination are
of little help, because those intuitions may well be closely tied to the
actual social consequences of discrimination, or to the history of those
consequences. If whites and blacks had relatively equal wealth, income,
longevity, education, and so forth, it is entirely possible that we would
not in fact regard isolated acts of racial discrimination as seriously
wrong. It is possible, of course, that we would be wrong not to regard
such acts as seriously wrong, but then we need an argument that does not
appeal to intuitions. My general point remains that it is extremely difficult
to know what is driving our intuitions about acts of discrimination when
such discrimination has been part of a pattern that has generated massive
social and economic inequalities.
I accept what I take to be the dominant line of argument in the legal
literature on discrimination, namely, that discrimination is wrong not
primarily because it involves individual animus or aversion, but because
it contributes to a pattern of social and economic subordination.17
Interestingly, from that perspective, I believe that both racial and sexual
discrimination may be less important than they are commonly thought to
be. I believe that there is a pattern of racial inequality and subordination,
but there is reason to think that racial discrimination, as such, is no
longer a primary cause of that pattern. By contrast, there may be cases
of sexual discrimination, but I do not believe that there is now a pattern
of social and economic subordination.
16. Alexander, supra note 7, at 151.
17. Samuel R. Bagenstos, “Rational Discrimination,” Accommodation, and the
Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825, 837-39 (2003).
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Let me begin with sexual inequality. I do not doubt that there are
numerous and important ways in which sexual inequality and injustice
persist. Still, I think that there are numerous reasons to suggest that
sexual inequality is not a pervasive form of social and economic
inequality and injustice, and that it is on a declining trajectory. While
women experienced significant barriers to entry to educational institutions
and to the professions for many years, it did not take long for women to
compete successfully with men when those barriers were (substantially)
removed. The contrast with racial inequality could not be starker, for
when barriers to entry for blacks were (largely) eliminated, blacks were
not in a position to successfully compete with whites—and still are not.
We know that girls outperform boys in school. We know that
approximately 60% of undergraduates are female.18 We know that
some of the traditional bastions of male dominance, such as medical
school and law school, now enroll roughly the same number of males
and females. We know that women live longer than men. Although a
woman is only 14% more likely to die from breast cancer than a man is
from prostate cancer, funding for breast cancer research is 660% greater
than funding for prostate cancer research.19 Women do earn less than
men, but there is good reason to think that the earnings gap is closing
and that much of the gap is attributable to “life style” choices that, even
if associated with inequalities within the family, are not attributable to
injustices by the employers. To believe in wage discrimination is to
believe that employers are prepared to pay men more than the market
requires (they cannot pay women less than the market requires).
Moreover, an earnings gap is not a spending gap. Given familial altruism,
higher earning males will typically share their income with their lower
earning spouses, whereas no form of altruism shifts disposable income
from whites to blacks. There is no reason to think that females receive
less adequate nutrition or medical care or housing. Although women are
more likely to be victimized by sexual offenses, they are less likely to be
victimized by violent crimes. Nor should any of this be surprising. For
whatever the forms of discrimination that were practiced against women
18. See CBS, The Gender Gap: Boys Lagging (May 25, 2003), http://www.
cbsnews.com/stories/2002/10/31/60minutes/main527678.shtml; IES NATIONAL CENTER
FOR EDUCATIONAL STATISTICS, FAST FACTS (2005), http://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.
asp?id=72 (last visited Dec. 20, 2006).
19. Marty Nemko, Should We Pay More Attention to Men’s Health?, Sept. 17,
2006, http://www.martynemko.com/pub/articles/mens-health.shtm.
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in previous generations, girls and boys were raised in the same households.
They received the same quality medical care and nutrition. They went to
the same schools, and so forth. And so, for the most part, the developed
capabilities of males and females have always been quite comparable.
Moreover, despite all the worries about socialization and the need for
role models, the aspirations of women changed very quickly when
barriers to entry were eliminated.
Interestingly, it is quite likely that the decline of sexual discrimination
has intensified socioeconomic inequalities that we are loath to describe
as discrimination or regard as morally problematic. The problem is
assortative mating or homogamy. Both men and women are prone to
choose mates with similar levels of educational attainment and similar
earning prospects. True, some persons, typically male, might prefer to
mate “down” so that they are the more powerful person in the relationship
or use their wealth to gain access to “trophy” spouses, whereas others,
typically female, prefer to mate “up” so that they can garner the economic
benefits of the higher earning mate. But, setting aside the mating prospects
of lower socioeconomic status (SES) attractive women, who are able to
trade their beauty for income, most persons mate with partners of
comparable SES. In some cases, the choices are completely voluntary in
the sense that high SES persons prefer to mate with high SES persons
and some lower SES persons would be uncomfortable mating “up.” But
even where most people would prefer to mate “up,” they will end up
with mates at comparable levels because the higher-ranked potential
mates will already have been taken.
When one combines assortative mating with the entry of women into
the paid labor force and the higher paying professions, the consequence
is likely to be an increase in the inequality of household income, wealth,
and years of educational attainment. In the world where women were
excluded from much of the job force, many desirable positions would go
to relatively low ability males because they did not have to compete with
higher ability women, and so lower SES women would be able to garner
the economic benefits of a higher earning spouse. In a world where
women are not excluded from the job force, the lower ability males are
unable to get these desirable positions. As a consequence, the high
ability couple has two desirable positions and the lower ability couple
has none. Here we have a situation in which two forms of differential
treatment combine to generate massive social and economic inequalities
that are passed down to subsequent generations. First, we have the
inequalities of reward for positions that are generated by the market and
that tend to reward positions that require higher cognitive abilities. This
inequality does not result from any direct differentiation by particular
persons, and so arguably does not qualify as any form of discrimination,
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even though it is a form of inequality that some have thought to be
unjust or at least morally questionable because it depends so much on
the brute luck of the natural lottery. Second, we have the inequalities
produced by assortative mating. These mating choices are the result of
direct differentiations by particular persons, but they do not seem to
qualify as wrongful discrimination because they occur in an area of life
that we believe should be immune from governmental intervention. I
am, of course, not claiming that the decline of sexual inequality is bad. I
am claiming that the aggregation of non-wrongful choices may have
justice-related consequences which may demand our attention.
By contrast with sexual inequality, racial inequality is a massive social
problem in the United States across the whole spectrum of dimensions of
well-being: infant mortality, longevity, health, education, income, wealth,
housing, single-parent families, and so forth. Yet, even here, it is arguable
that racial discrimination is not the primary problem. It is certainly the
case that decades of racial oppression and discrimination have played the
dominant causal role in generating contemporary racial inequality, but it
is much less clear that racial discrimination as such is the primary
problem today.
In his important work, The Anatomy of Racial Inequality, Glenn Loury
argued that racial discrimination “should be demoted, dislodged from its
current prominent place in the conceptual discourse on racial inequality
in American life.”20 Loury maintains that while racial discrimination of
the standard sort has not vanished, it is universally recognized as a moral
problem, and virtually everyone agrees that it should be proscribed.
Loury argues that it is of capital importance to distinguish between
“discrimination in contract” and “discrimination in contact.”21
Discrimination in contract refers to unequal treatment on the basis of
race in formal transactions, such as the buying and selling of goods and
services, whereas discrimination in contact refers to the unequal
treatment of persons on the basis of race in “the associations and
relationships that are formed among individuals in social life, including
the choice of social intimates, neighbors, friends, heroes, and villains. It
involves discrimination in the informal, private spheres of life.”22
Although discrimination in contact may not be as morally objectionable
as discrimination in contract, indeed, it may not be morally objectionable at
20.
21.
22.

GLENN C. LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY 93 (2002).
Id. at 95.
Id. at 95-96.
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all, its real-world consequences can be just as debilitating for a racially
stigmatized group because “the mechanisms of social mobility and
intergenerational status transmission . . . are crucially sensitive to the
patterns of contact . . . in that society.”23 Far too many blacks are simply
unable to gain access to the social resources that are essential to human
flourishing, but which are acquired through informal but race-influenced
social intercourse. Loury argues that the central problem today is racial
disparity in “developmental opportunities,” and that, as a consequence,
the developed capabilities of blacks are significantly lower, on average,
than the developed capabilities of whites.24
On Loury’s view, discrimination in contact gives rise to an intractable
problem. Whereas a liberal state could exercise control over discrimination
in contract, any recognizably liberal state must preserve the freedom of
individuals to engage in discrimination in contact, and this is so for two
reasons. First, “the social exchanges . . . are so profoundly intimate and
cut so close to the core of our being that all but the most modest
interventions in this sphere must be avoided if liberty and autonomy are
to have any real meaning.”25 Second, whereas the ethical case against
discrimination in contract is relatively easy to make, it is much less
obvious that there is anything wrong, in principle, with forming or
avoiding close personal contact on the basis of racial identity.26
The distinction between discrimination in contract and discrimination
in contact is correlated with the distinction between discrimination,
which concerns the way in which people are treated, and stigma, which
concerns the way in which whites understand and perceive their black
compatriots at the cognitive and emotional level.27 The primary cause of
discrimination in contact is that white Americans are characterized by
patterns of thought and biased processes of social cognition that lead
them to avoid the sorts of contact with black Americans that are crucial
to acquiring opportunities for social and economic success. Loury
argues that this pattern may justify race-conscious policies that show
promise of mediating the attendant effects. On his view, the claim that
race is intrinsically of no moral relevance (which he accepts) does not
entail the claim that it must be wrong to use race as a basis for public
policy.

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
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D. Mating as Discrimination
I do not want to pursue those policies here. However, I want to raise
the issue of mating once again. Although we do not regard racial
preference in mating as a form of discrimination, the fact remains that
love is not blind when it comes to color and that this has profound social
consequences. If blacks and whites married each other without respect
to race (in which case most whites would marry whites whereas most
blacks would also marry whites), racial inequality as such would vanish
within a generation, although class inequality would remain. I say this
not only for the tautologous reason that the children of a black mother or
father would typically have a white parent as well, but because the
socioeconomic mobility of blacks would increase dramatically. At
present, it is difficult for black females to improve their economic
situation through marriage, in part because black male unemployment is
very high and so many black males are in prison. That would change
with a dramatic increase in intermarriage. But while racial intermarriage
has increased from 1% of all married couples in 1970 to 5% in 2000, and
while hostility towards racial intermarriage has declined (35% favored
laws against marriages between blacks and whites in the 1970s; 10%
favored such laws in the 2000s), racial intermarriage between blacks and
whites is still relatively rare.28
Is this a cause for concern? Yes, no, and yes. Larry Alexander writes
that “discriminatory preferences are intrinsically morally wrong if
premised on error, moral or factual, about the dispreferred.”29 Now, I do
not say that racial preferences with respect to potential mates are based
on either moral or factual error, but it is arguable that it would be
morally preferable if most of us were less responsive to race, if we
treated skin color on a par with eye color. I do not think it an indefensible
stretch of Alexander’s view to argue that, by this criterion, these kinds of
discriminatory preferences are morally wrong. Even if we have a right
to choose our mates on the basis of any criteria whatsoever (assuming
that they also choose us), it may be less than morally optimal to choose
them on the basis of certain criteria. We may have a right to do wrong.
So the first answer is yes, racially based mating may be a cause for
concern. The second answer may be no. Alexander says that
28. Sharon M. Lee & Barry Edmonston, New Marriages, New Families: U.S.
Racial and Hispanic Intermarriage, 60 POPULATION BULL., June 2005, at 3, 7.
29. Alexander, supra note 7, at 219.
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“[d]iscriminatory preferences are extrinsically morally wrong if their
social costs are large relative to the costs of eliminating or frustrating
them.”30 On this two-pronged view, it seems likely that racially biased
mating preferences are not extrinsically morally wrong. If I am right,
racially based mating preferences pass Alexander’s first test: “harmful
social effects will ensue from bias, given the numbers and group
characteristics.”31 But they are unlikely to pass the second test. Given
the prevalence, strength, and low malleability of these preferences, it
seems likely that the social costs of using the coercive powers of the
state to eliminate or frustrate them would be even higher. Of course,
even if a liberal state should not exercise its coercive powers in this
arena, it is an open question as to whether it should use the moral
educational powers of the state to motivate people not to choose
potential mates by the color of their skin but by the content of their
character or whatever other characteristics are morally acceptable for
such preferences.
Let us assume that the pattern of racially biased mating choices has
harmful social effects, but that people have a right to make racially
biased mating choices and that the legitimate use of the legitimate
powers of the state is unlikely to significantly alter those preferences.
That is not the end of the story. Precisely because society decides to
allow racially based mating choices, it may also acquire a responsibility
to remedy or soften the harmful social consequences of such choices.
We can think of this problem in Rawlsian terms. Rawls argues that a
just society will guarantee certain basic liberties to all and that it will
also seek to promote equality of fair opportunity.32 There are, however,
limits on society’s ability to realize these ends. For example, Rawls
explicitly recognizes that “the principle of fair opportunity can be only
imperfectly carried out, at least as long as some form of the family
exists.”33 Put crudely, some families are better than others. We could
seek to eliminate the family so as to guarantee equal opportunity, at least
in this respect, but that is not only not feasible, it is entirely possible that
the freedom to form families is one of the basic freedoms which the first
principle requires and which has priority over the principle of fair
opportunity. Much the same is true for the arbitrary effects of the
natural lottery. Even if it were feasible to equalize people’s natural
talents through bio-medical intervention, and Rawls does not consider

30.
31.
32.
33.
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that possibility, it is likely that he would reject that policy on moral
grounds.34
Enter the “difference principle.” Precisely because there are limits on
our ability to realize fair equality of opportunity and precisely because
we cannot or should not seek to eliminate arbitrary effects of the natural
lottery, Rawls seeks a principle which recognizes these facts and which
mitigates their effects. Thus, Rawls advances the “difference principle,”
which holds that the more favored may benefit from their undeserved
and arbitrary assets but only on certain terms “that improve the situation
of those who have lost out.”35
We do not need to endorse the entire structure or content of Rawls’s
theory. The general point is that if there are moral reasons to allow
people to make choices that generate social harm or injustice, we may
also have moral reason to address their effects, and particularly so when
the choices themselves result from a morally questionable preference
structure. Just as social security taxes are the price we pay for not
having our parents live with us, a set of social programs or policies that I
will not seek to specify here may be the price that we have to pay for
allowing people the freedom to indulge their racially biased mating
preferences. We can and sometimes should take collective responsibility
for harms that we did not cause36 and for harms that we may have a right
to cause.
III. REACTION QUALIFICATION REVISITED
Give a boy a hammer and everything becomes a nail. As I
(re)watched episodes of Seinfeld, I noted at least three episodes in which
reaction qualifications come to the fore.
BREASTS. In one episode, Jerry and Elaine notice that all the waitresses
in their coffee shop are amply endowed. Here is the dialogue:
JERRY: Yeah. Have you noticed anything else that’s different since the new
management?
ELAINE: Mmm. They’re putting a little lemon in the tuna. I love that.
JERRY: Beside that. Look at the waitresses.
ELAINE: Yeah? (we see that all the waitresses have big breasts)
34.
35.
36.

See id. at 89-92.
Id. at 87.
For example, disabilities and genetic susceptibility.
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JERRY: What physical characteristic would you say is common to all of them?
ELAINE: Ah . . . .
JERRY: I mean look at this. Every waitress working here has the same
proportions. Wouldn’t you say?
ELAINE: Yes, I would say.
JERRY: What’s going on here? How is that possible?
ELAINE: Do you think it’s a coincidence?
JERRY: No. I haven’t seen four women like this together outside of a Russ
Meyer film.
(the waitress finally came with the coffee)
ELAINE: (to the waitress) Hi. Excuse me. Who does all the hiring waitresses
here?
WAITRESS: He does. (pointing to the manager, Mr. Visaki) In fact we’re
looking for another girl if you know anyone. (she walks away)
ELAINE: You know what? That’s discriminatory. That is unfair. Why should
these women have all the advantages? It’s not enough they get all the attention
from men, they have to get all the waitress jobs, too? [It turns out that these
women had similar figures not because the restaurant owner was catering to the
preferences of superficial males, but because they were his daughters.]37

THE MASSEUR. George and Elaine go to get massages and George finds
that his will be performed by a man. Here is the dialogue.
RECEPTIONIST: George and Elaine, right? Could you fill these out for me
please? And Elaine, you’ll be seeing Julianna, and George, you’ll be with
Raymond.
GEORGE: Excuse me, did you say ‘Raymond’?
RECEPTIONIST: Yes.
GEORGE: But, uh, Raymond is a man.
RECEPTIONIST: That’s right.
GEORGE: I can’t get a massage from a man.
ELAINE: Why not?
GEORGE: What, are you crazy? I can’t have a man touching me. Switch with
me.
ELAINE: No, I don’t want the man either.
GEORGE: What’s the difference, you’re a woman. They’re supposed to be
touching you.
ELAINE: He’d just be touching your back.
GEORGE: He’d just be touching your back too.
ELAINE: No, it could get sexual.

37. Seinfeld: The Pilot (NBC television broadcast, Season 4, Episode 1) (transcript
available at http://www.seinfeldscripts.com/ThePilot.html).
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GEORGE: I know. That’s the point. If it’s gonna get sexual, it should get
sexual with you.
ELAINE: I wouldn’t be comfortable.
GEORGE: I would? What if something happens?
ELAINE: What could happen?
GEORGE: What if it felt good?
ELAINE: It’s supposed to feel good.
GEORGE: I don’t want it to feel good.
[The experience proved traumatic for George because he thinks that he was
aroused by Raymond’s massage.]38

THE CHINESE WOMAN. In this episode, George’s mother, Estelle, has a
conversation on the phone with a woman named Donna Chang (it has
been shortened from Changstein).
George’s parents have been
considering divorce, and Estelle was inclined to take the advice seriously
until she discovered that Donna Chang was not Asian. Here is the
dialogue.
ESTELLE: You’re not Chinese!?!?
DONNA: [pause] No.
ESTELLE: I thought you were Chinese!!
DONNA: I’m from Long Island.
ESTELLE: Long Island?!?! I thought I was getting advice from a Chinese
woman!!
DONNA: I’m sorry . . . ?
ESTELLE: Well! Then, that changes everything!
GEORGE: What?!
ESTELLE: She’s not Chinese; I was duped!!
GEORGE: So what?! She gave you advice; what’s the difference if she’s not
Chinese?!?!
ESTELLE: I’m not taking advice from some girl from Long Island!!39

Let us suppose that the restaurateur did hire large breasted women
because he correctly thought that it was good for business. Let us
38. Seinfeld: The Note (NBC television broadcast, Season 3, Episode 19) (transcript
available at http://www.seinfeldscripts.com/TheNote.html).
39. Seinfeld: The Chinese Woman (NBC television broadcast, Season 6, Episode
90) (transcript available at http://www.seinfeldscripts.com/episodes_overview.html).
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suppose that the majority of people prefer masseuses to masseurs. Let
us suppose that people prefer Asian advice givers or Jamaican fortune
tellers. Let us suppose, then, that an employer would be making a
rational market decision to discriminate on the basis of sex and breast
size, sex, and race. Or, as in a recent case, let us suppose that Jazzercise,
a franchise operation, is making a rational market decision when it
refused to hire a highly fit 5’8” 240-pound woman who sought work as
an aerobics instructor because she did not possess a “fit appearance.”40
Would it be wrong for them to do so?
Most legal scholars41 endorse normatively as well as legally the view
that employers should be prohibited from hiring on the basis of race or
sex when those hirings are profit-maximizing, because customers, or
clients, or “targets,” or other employees are prejudiced. Consider Mark
Kelman’s argument. Kelman defines simple discrimination as “differential
treatment despite equality along ‘relevant’ dimensions,”42 such as when
an employer refuses to hire an applicant on the basis of an irrelevant
characteristic just because he has an aversion to persons with that
characteristic.43 Laws prohibiting simple discrimination prohibit the
employer from treating people worse than they treat others who provide
them equal amounts of money. So if a black widget maker would make
just as many widgets as a white widget maker, the employer engages in
simple discrimination if he refuses to hire the black applicant because of
the applicant’s race. Laws prohibiting simple discrimination protect
applicants from such “market-irrational treatment.”44
By contrast, consider a case in which a retailer prefers to hire a white
person because he correctly believes that his potential customers will
buy more from a white salesperson than a black salesperson even if the
black candidate would perform all the “physical” aspects of the job in
precisely the same manner as the white applicant. Or similarly, consider
a case in which a restaurant owner correctly believes that she will do
more business if she hires attractive young women as waitresses rather
than men. In other words, we will assume that the employer’s decision
is not rooted “in animus or false stereotypes but in private economic
rationality.”45 As Kelman notes, the positive law is clear. Employers
cannot make market rational decisions that reflect racist or sexist
40. Dan Ackman, The Case of the Fat Aerobics Instructor, FORBES, May 9, 2002,
available at http://www.forbes.com/2002/05/09/0509portnick.html (last visited Dec. 22,
2006).
41. Richard Epstein is a notable exception.
42. Mark Kelman, Market Discrimination and Groups, 53 STAN. L. REV. 833, 840
(2001).
43. Id. at 848.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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customer reactions. Kelman argues that we should regard these sorts of
reaction qualification cases as a version of “simple discrimination” by
the employers. Why? Because the customers themselves are “duty-bound”
to treat employees “with whom they deal in an impersonal, capitalist,
rational fashion,” and so the right of a prospective employee against
discrimination by the employer forbids the employer from acting as an
agent for the customer’s illegitimate preferences.46 Similarly, Samuel
Bagenstos states that most scholars “have had little difficulty attributing
to employers the animus of their customers or employees,” although
many cases seem to involve profit-maximizing rather than “animus.”47
Something like this dispute plays itself out in discussions of the
“essence” of a business. On one view, many businesses have a particular
essence. The essence of an airline is to transport passengers. The essence
of a restaurant is to serve food. From that perspective, flight attendants
should be chosen on the basis of their ability to assist in transporting
passengers safely. On another view, businesses do not have essence.
They exist to make a profit, and do so by providing their customers with
whatever it is that the customers desire as realized through the market.
Kimberly Yuracko argues that the latter view is really an argument “for
essences of a different sort,” namely, “market responsiveness, with all the
complexity this may entail.”48 That linguistic move does not collapse the
distinction at stake here. For whatever terms we use, there is a crucial
difference between the constrained account of business essence to which
the Court appealed in Diaz and the pluralistic openness of a “market
responsiveness” conception of business essence that views businesses as
serving the variegated preferences of its customers.
Setting positive law aside, when is it legitimate for employers to take
account of the preferences of customers or, more broadly, the reactions
of the persons whose reactions to the behavior or characteristics of an
46. Id.
47. Bagenstos, supra note 17, at 849 n.66 (citing, for example, John Donohue, who
argues that “intrinsic equality measures workers based on the ‘true value of [their] labor’
and disregards any preferences customers or coworkers have against associating with
particular classes of workers,” and Owen M. Fiss who has made a similar argument).
Bagenstos adds that he sees no need to dispute that view and that he will treat “customeror coworker-preference-based discrimination as animus-based discrimination.” See id. at
849-51 (acknowledging that many forms of present-day problems of discrimination by
employers involve maximizing profit and not “animus”).
48. A view adopted by Richard A. Epstein. See Kimberly A. Yuracko, Private
Nurses and Playboy Bunnies: Explaining Permissible Sex Discrimination, 92 CAL. L.
REV. 147, 166 n.63 (2004).
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employee are crucial to the position? I shall refer to such persons as
reactors. Although I did not solve this issue in JQP, I may have
underestimated, if anything, the range of jobs for which reactions are
crucial to an employee’s effectiveness. Indeed, as our economy becomes
increasingly dominated by services as opposed to products and
manufacturing, the proportion of jobs in which reaction qualifications
(some scholars use the phrase “soft qualifications”) will figure
prominently will also increase. The case of the racially prejudiced retail
customers or the sexist airline travelers grossly understates the problem.
Here are some examples:
(I) POLICE OFFICERS
The efficacy of a police officer may depend upon his or her ability to
make citizens feel safe, to get suspects to cooperate nonviolently, to
encourage citizens to come forth with information, and the confidence of
his or her fellow officers, et cetera. In turn, these responses may be
influenced by the officer’s race, sex, size, demeanor, and so on.
(II) TEACHERS
The efficacy of a teacher depends upon his or her ability to induce
learning. This may depend, among other things, upon the teacher’s
ability to establish order and discipline in the classroom. Student
reactions to a teacher’s sex, size, and race may all affect the teacher’s
efficacy.
(III) TEACHING ASSISTANTS
A teacher’s ability also depends upon the capacity of students to
understand the teacher’s speech. American college students often find it
hard to understand foreign-born teaching assistants. This may be
partially due to preferences, but is most likely a simple function of one’s
unconscious ability to decipher speech.
(IV) LAWYERS
The efficacy of a lawyer turns, in part, on the way in which other
attorneys, witnesses, judges, jurors, and clients respond to him or her.
This may not only involve reactions to the lawyer’s physical acts,
including oral statements and written documents, but to his or her
personality, demeanor, aggressiveness, et cetera. Moreover, the success
of a lawyer as a source of income to his or her firm depends, in part,
upon the preferences of clients. If clients prefer to be represented by
aggressive males rather than 5’0” females, then aggressive males will
generate more income for the firm and, in that sense, are more qualified,
other things being equal.
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(V) ADVERTISING MODELS
Obviously, the efficacy of a model is a function of his or her ability to
induce customers to purchase the product. Customers may respond to
sex, beauty, bodily shape, height, race, ethnicity, et cetera.
(VI) ROLE MODELS
It is sometimes argued that other things (roughly) equal, we should
hire persons of a particular sex or race because they can serve as a role
model for people who identify with that characteristic and where those
reactions may be independent of any action by the employee.
(VII) GYNECOLOGIST
The efficacy of a physician is a function of his or her diagnostic and
therapeutic abilities, but is also a function of the physician’s capacity to
induce trust, openness, and compliance in the patient. If females
respond more favorably and are more likely to seek out care from a
female gynecologist than a male gynecologist, then, ceteris paribus, a
female will be more effective.
(VIII) PITCHERS
The efficacy of a baseball pitcher is a function of his ability to prevent
the opponents from scoring runs. Period. If batters of a particular team
find it difficult to hit a left-handed pitcher, then a left hander is better
qualified to pitch against this team even if, on other criteria, he is less
able than a right handed pitcher.
(IX) RESTAURANTS
The market value of a chef is not defined by his or her ability to
produce the highest quality food as evaluated by the gourmet, but by his
or her ability to attract customers. And the same is true for servers, be it
Hooters, Joe’s Stone Crab, or Jerry Seinfeld’s coffee shop. It is worth
noting that Zagat’s guides specifically evaluate restaurants on ambience,
and there is no reason to doubt that the sex or race or attractiveness or
personality of the servers contributes to that ambience.49 Consider this
excerpt from a New York Times restaurant review on the day after this
paragraph was originally written:

49.

For example, Durgin Park in Boston may require that its servers are rude.
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Table XII is defiantly retro and proudly old-fashioned, in terms of both its food
and its setting. The long path from the entrance to the dining room is covered in
leopard print carpeting. That dining room has white walls with gleaming gold
trim and an air of unabashed Old World opulence. . . . The servers wear crisply
pressed suits with tightly buttoned jackets, and everything about the way they move
and gesture has a somewhat antiquated, but endearing, formality. What they strive
to project is not so much affability as respect. Remember those days?50

(X) PRIVATE NURSES
As Kim Yuracko points out, female patients may have a distinct
preference to be cared for by female nurses.51
(XI) SALESPEOPLE
The job of a salesperson is to sell. Customers may respond (consciously
or unconsciously) to the race, sex, personality, height, and beauty of the
salesperson.
(XII) AIRPORT SCREENERS
When body searches are to be performed, female travelers have a
strong preference to be searched by female screeners rather than male
screeners (I do not know whether men have any strong preference here).
If minimizing passenger discomfort is part of the job’s qualifications (it
may not be), then women are more qualified to do body searches of
female passengers.
(XIII) INTERIOR DECORATORS
If we evaluate interior decorators by their business success rather than
aesthetically, customers may prefer effeminate males to more masculine
males or females because customers believe that gay men have superior
aesthetic taste. A similar phenomenon may hold with respect to hair
stylists.
It is clear, then, that the preferences and reactions of persons
dramatically affect or even define an employee’s job effectiveness and
that these reactions can be (consciously or unconsciously) responsive to
an employee’s race, sex, ethnicity, personality, speech patterns, bodily
shape, and so forth. The question is this: When is it morally legitimate
for employers to consider the relevant reactions as a dimension of a
prospective employee’s efficacy in deciding whom to hire? There are
only two plausible positions.52 First, it could be argued that it is always
50. Frank Bruni, Diner’s Journal, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2006, at E41.
51. Yuracko, supra note 48, at 170.
52. It would be preposterous to adopt a third view, under which it is always
illegitimate for employers to take account of reactions.
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legitimate for a business to make reaction-based market rational decisions,53
even when those reactions reflect preferences of dubious moral legitimacy.
Second, it could be argued that it is sometimes legitimate for businesses
to make reaction-based market rational decisions and sometimes not. Let
us assume that some version of the second view is correct. What
version? It is clear that our intuitions vary from case to case. I suspect
that some cases will produce high consensus, whereas others will not.
We are inclined to think that a retailer should not cater to the racial
prejudices of his customers, but that it is perfectly reasonable for a
university to cater to the sexual preference of its female students in
hiring a gynecologist, and that a nursing home could legitimately hire
female nurses for its female patients. Can we find a plausible principle
by which to make these distinctions?
I think this is very difficult indeed. It is clearly not enough to say that
employers should not take account of responder’s reactions when they
result from prejudice. That begs the question as to what counts as a
“prejudice.” Was George “prejudiced” against masseurs? Was Estelle
“prejudiced” against non-Asian advisors? Are reactions based on nonspurious proxies a case of prejudice? And should we treat all “prejudices”
equally? In JQP, I argued that given the social context and given the
nation’s history, it was more legitimate to hire a black police officer for
a black community, if the black officer was more qualified than the
white because of reaction qualifications, than to hire a white police
officer for a white community for similar reasons.54 Of course, even if
this were so as a matter of morality, it might still make sense for the law
to adopt a race neutral approach under which these two hirings stand or
fall together.
Interestingly, even when it is otherwise illegitimate to count reactions
to race, there may be overriding moral reason to do so. Suppose that
white citizens in a predominantly white community are less likely to
cooperate with black police officers than with white police officers and
that, as a result, more innocent people are victimized if blacks are hired.
It is arguable that the interests of prospective victims outweigh the
interests of job candidates.55
53. Indeed, it could be argued that they should be permitted to make market
irrational decisions; however, this Article does not address that argument.
54. Wertheimer, supra note 1, at 107.
55. This Article will ignore consequentialist arguments that maintain that, in the
long run, it will prove better to “sacrifice” some victims of crime in order to reduce
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Whereas some racist and sexist preferences seem to involve aversions,
others appear to be “pro” preferences. Whatever else we might want to
say, it is obvious that Hooters, Playboy Bunnies, and Southwest Airlines
(in its previous incarnation as a “love” airline rather than a low cost
airline), do or did not involve sexual distinctions rooted in aversion. Or
is it so obvious? Andrew Koppelman seems to want to turn this
preference lemonade into a preference lemon:
The idea that women are particularly well suited for the task of flight attendant,
for example, is closely associated with the idea of separate, ascriptive spheres
for men and women, and that idea, we have seen, is closely associated with the
devaluation of women. The customers’ preferences thus have a component that
is malign, that denies respect for persons. If we respect preferences only
because we respect persons, then we must withhold our respect from these
preferences.56

This moves much too quickly. First, unless we tautologically define a
male’s desire to be served by flight attendants as equivalent to believing
that they are “particularly well suited” for the task, I see no reason to
think that the male customers of Southwest Airlines believed that
women “are particularly well suited for the task of flight attendant.”
Second, it is not clear what it is for that preference to be “closely
associated” with another. Third, absent the relevant psychological
evidence, I simply see no reason to think that this preference is rooted in
a commitment to separate spheres. If Marx’s vision of communist
society was one in which people can “hunt in the morning, fish in the
afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticise after dinner . . . without
ever becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd or critic,”57 cannot men be
attentive fathers to their daughters in the morning, work with female
colleagues in the afternoon, and enjoy going to Hooters after work
before returning home to their professional wives? Fourth, I simply do
not see why this is a malign preference that implies the “devaluation of
women” or denies respect for persons. This may be so, but it seems to
load much too much psychological weight onto something that may be
much simpler and much less malignant. Even in sex, sometimes a cigar
is just a cigar.

racial prejudice and inequality. The principle may be valid and the prediction is
plausible; however, it is simply too difficult to assess.
56. ANDREW KOPPELMAN, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND SOCIAL EQUALITY 140
(1996) (emphasis in original).
57. Karl Marx, The German Ideology: Part I, in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 160
(Robert C. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1978) (1932).
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A. Laundering Preferences
Let us assume what I doubt is the case, namely, that Koppelman’s
description of these preferences is correct. Does it follow that we should
not count such preferences or that we should prohibit others from
counting them? Napoleon once said, “[e]ven if I had done wrong you
should not have accused me publicly. People wash their dirty linen at
home.”58 If we have dirty preferences in our minds, should we move
them to the public realm, where, as a matter of public policy, employers
are required to launder or discount or ignore those preferences?
Koppelman thinks so, as does David Strauss:
The judgment that taste-based discrimination is wrong rests primarily on the
view that the taste for racial discrimination is illegitimate. That is, no one
should be made worse off simply to satisfy someone else’s racial animus. The
satisfaction of the desire not to associate with members of another racial group,
at least in the employment context, should not count in the social welfare
function.59

There are two strategies for the principle that we should not allow
employers to count the illegitimate preferences of responders. The first
strategy adopts a general consequentialist framework and maintains that
the long-term consequences of adopting a decision rule of allowing
employers to count such preferences has suboptimal consequences if we
give equal consideration to the interests of all, but that decision is
reached after giving full weight to such preferences in assessing the
range of decision rules. All preferences are counted as inputs in the
calculation of the best social policy, but the output of the process yields
a decision rule that some inputs should be ignored. The second strategy,
which is adopted by Koppelman and Will Kymlicka, among others,
maintains that a consequentialist argument for counting certain sorts of
illegitimate preferences as inputs is inconsistent with the underlying
moral motivation for respecting preferences in the first place. As
Koppelman puts it, “If we respect preferences only because we respect
persons, then we must withhold our respect from these preferences.”60
58. ROBERT ANDREWS, THE CONCISE COLUMBIA DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 15051 (1989).
59. David A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination in
Employment: The Case for Numerical Standards, 79 GEO. L.J. 1618, 1625 (1991)
(footnotes omitted).
60. KOPPELMAN, supra note 56, at 140.
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Will Kymlicka argues that if the “deepest principle” for utilitarianism is
egalitarian, the notion that “[e]ach person has an equal moral standing,”
then it seems inconsistent to count preferences which deny that
principle.61
It is possible that the first argument works to support preference
laundering, but since that would depend upon complicated calculations, I
will set that argument aside. With respect to the second argument, here
too I am inclined to think that the argument moves much too quickly.
Even if we accept the view that consequentialism is best justified as a
way of instantiating a commitment to the equal worth of all persons, it
simply does not follow that the underlying motivation must be used as a
screening device for the inputs into that consequentialism. To exemplify
this point, note that Rawls does not insist that individuals in a just
society must be motivated by the principles that define the basic
structure in which they operate:
Ideally the rules should be set up so that men are led by their predominant
interests to act in ways which further socially desirable ends. The conduct of
individuals guided by their rational plans should be coordinated as far as
possible to achieve results which although not intended or perhaps even
foreseen by them are nevertheless the best ones from the standpoint of social
justice.62

If a just society can allow individuals to be motivated by self-interest,
there is no logical inconsistency in claiming that a commitment to the
equal moral worth of persons or to equal respect is compatible with
counting preferences that do not reflect that commitment. Even when
preferences are immoral, it may not be immoral to count them. After all,
we respect people in numerous ways, but one way in which we respect
people is, within reason, to avoid being too judgmental about their
preferences. We generally think it best to grant freedom of speech to
those who deny that value. And we might think it best to count the
preferences of those who do not as committed to equal respect for all
persons.
Indeed, one can go farther. If, as Koppelman suggests, most versions
of consequentialism are motivated by a commitment to equal respect for
individuals, it could be argued, although Koppelman does not, that this
requires everyone to act on that principle. After all, to act on the basis of
self-interested desires or to show partiality towards one’s family or
friends is not to show equal respect; it does not reflect the commitment
to impartiality that motivates consequentialism. This is the view

61.
62.
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famously adopted by Peter Singer.63 Setting aside how individuals should
act, it could be argued that, for the same reasons, public policy should
refuse to count preferences that do not reflect such a commitment.
And that seems to go too far. Now one might try to drive a wedge
between the partial preferences that a commitment to impartiality does
allow and the prejudiced preferences that it does not. Along with
Koppelman, one might say, for example, that it is permissible for me to
prefer my wife’s interests to a stranger’s interests, but not to prefer being
served by men rather than women, or women rather than men, or whites
rather than blacks. But it is by no means clear how such an argument
would go and whether it would prove successful.
Another difficulty with the claim that “illegitimate” preferences should
not be counted is that the notion of an illegitimate preference is decidedly
ambiguous. If it refers to preferences that should not be counted, then it is
simply true by definition, but obviously solves nothing. If it refers to
preferences that are bad or less than optimal for people to have, then it
clearly ranges much too widely. After all, the market as we know it
caters to all sorts of arguably illegitimate preferences: cigarettes,
professional wrestling, reality television, SUVs, breast implants, pornographic
movies, expensive cappuccino makers, enormous homes, and the like,
not to mention bad Chinese food and tofu. We allow people to solicit
dates on christiansingles.com, jdate.com, and blackpeoplemeet.com. We
can argue about which, if any, of these preferences are illegitimate, but it
would be crazy to think that, as a general principle, we could or should
try to prevent the market from accommodating illegitimate preferences.
I have not attempted to nor have I produced a knock-down argument
against laundering preferences or for the view that all preferences should
be counted. If we adopt a general consequentialist strategy, it is an open
question as to whether the best regime will allow employers to respond
to whatever reactions the responders bring to the table or will instead
require employers not to take account of certain reactions and, if so,
which ones. On the one hand, there might be utilitarian reasons to adopt
a regime in which we accepted people’s preferences as we find them,
including biased or prejudiced preferences that are demonstrably malign,
just as there might be utilitarian reasons to adopt a regime in which
people are permitted to act on partiality. At the same time, it is also
63. Peter Singer, Famine, Affluence, and Morality, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 229, 23032 (1972).
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possible that from an impartial consequentialist perspective in which we
counted all preferences as inputs, we might decide on a regime that
discounted such preferences nonetheless because discounting them
promoted more utility in the long run, including the utility that would be
derived from changes in people’s preferences. Consider this analogy:
Fred Schauer has argued that while there is nothing wrong, in principle,
with using proxies or profiling when they are non-spurious, there might
be good reason to prohibit the use of proxies or profiling based on race
or sex even when it would otherwise be desirable to do so. For if there
is a tendency to overuse certain sorts of proxies and we cannot reliably
determine when the use of a proxy is reasonable, the best strategy might
be to ban an entire category of proxies.64 Similarly, here, perhaps it is
reasonable for Joe’s Stone Crab or Table XII to hire only males in order
to create a particular ambiance, but if we cannot reliably distinguish the
occupations in which such distinctions make sense from those where
they do not, it is possible that it is better to prohibit all such distinctionmaking.
B. Public and Private
I say it is possible. As Richard Arneson has argued, the ideal of
equality of opportunity applies to public life but not to private life.65 In
effect, the argument for laundering preferences in order to combat
wrongful discrimination seeks to convert what are arguably private
preferences into a target for public policy. Unfortunately, and as Arneson is
well aware, it is not as if we begin with a well-established distinction
between the public and the private spheres, such that President Clinton’s
sexual behavior was located in the private realm (or was it the public?).
As Fred Schauer puts it, “private” is typically the label we attach to
those activities and domains in which, for already decided normative
reasons, there is a justified interest in excluding someone else.66 And so
the left is now inclined to argue that sexuality and abortion are matters
of the private realm whereas discriminatory preferences are matters for
the public realm, while the right is apt to argue that sexuality and
abortion are matters of the public realm and discriminatory preferences
are matters of the private realm.
It is unlikely to prove correct that all hiring decisions are legitimate
targets of public policy. Arneson suggests, for example, that whom a
small business hires may be a private matter (it is fine if a restaurateur
64. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PROFILES, PROBABILITIES & STEREOTYPES (2003).
65. Arneson, supra note 14.
66. Frederick Schauer, Can Public Figures Have Private Lives?, 17 SOC. PHIL. &
POL’Y 293, 293 (2000).
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wants to hire his family or friends) but whom it serves is a public matter
(it is not fine if he excludes blacks).67 That is simply a way of saying
that the state does not have a sufficient interest in his hiring to justify
interference where it may have a sufficient interest in whom he serves.
And I take it that virtually no one would deny a family’s right to choose
a babysitter or nanny on the basis of whatever criteria it prefers, be it
race, sexual orientation, or religion, even if we think that some of those
preferences do not pass moral muster.
In the previous section I argued that there may be good reasons for the
state to adopt a general policy that would require firms to ignore certain
preferences even if it were economically rational for them to be
counted.68 And it is possible that this argument will prove decisive. At
the same time, it is also arguable that we should be strongly disposed
against placing a person’s beliefs and attitudes in the public realm, that
is, to make them a basis for public policy. At this juncture, I want to
bring Thomas Nagel’s reflections on moral psychology to bear on our
topic. In Concealment and Exposure, Nagel maintains that “[t]he grasp
of the public sphere and public norms has come to include too much.”69
He argues that many of the conventions of daily life are meant to keep a
“great range of potentially disruptive [psychic] material unacknowledged
and therefore out of play.”70 This material includes “feelings of hostility,
contempt, derision, envy, vanity, boredom, fear, sexual desire or aversion,
plus a great deal of simple self-absorption.”71
It is not just a matter of adopting social conventions that allow us to
conceal our innermost thoughts. It is also a matter of putting restraints
on the force of morality and conscience: “Everyone is entitled to commit
murder in the imagination once in a while, not to mention lesser
infractions.”72 As a general principle, “the idea that socialization should
penetrate to the innermost reaches of the soul, so that one should feel
guilty or ashamed of any thoughts or feelings that one would be unwilling
to express publicly” is downright pernicious.73 So, not unexpectedly for
a man of the left who continues to use “he” as a generic pronoun, Nagel
argues that “[t]he demand for public lip-service to certain pieties and
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Arneson, supra note 14.
See generally supra Part III.A.
Thomas Nagel, Concealment & Exposure, 27 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 5 (1998).
Id. at 6.
Id.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 9.
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vigilance against tell-tale signs in speech of unacceptable attitudes or
beliefs is due to an insistence that deep cultural conflicts should not
simply be tolerated, but must be turned into battles for control of the
common space.”74 And this we should resist.
Nagel is eminently aware that his argument can be understood as
being “too protective of the status quo” and that it will not satisfy those
who “think it necessary to overthrow pernicious conventions like the
double standard of sexual conduct . . . .”75 Yet he argues that “to the
extent . . . compatible with the protection of private rights, it would be
better if these battles for the soul of the culture were avoided . . . .”76 and
that:
No one should be in control of the culture, and the persistence of private racism,
sexism, homophobia, religious and ethnic bigotry, sexual puritanism, and other
such private pleasures should not provoke liberals to demand constant public
affirmation of the opposite values. The important battles are about how people
are required to treat each other, how social and economic institutions are to be
arranged, and how public resources are to be used.77

Even if Nagel’s argument is sound with respect to its principal target,
it may be thought that it is not entirely on point. For Nagel is primarily
concerned with our thoughts and not with our actions, not with how we
“treat each other.” It is possible that employer decisions responding to
racial prejudices and sexual feelings are of a different order, that this
concerns how people are treated and not with what is in someone’s mind.
But I think Nagel’s argument still has traction. If firms are required to
ignore the preferences or reactions of their customers or clients because
we have made a judgment that those preferences are illegitimate, then it
is as if the preferences themselves are treated as a form of action. As
Kelman puts it, “[c]ustomers are duty-bound under antidiscrimination
law to treat salespeople with whom they deal in an impersonal,
capitalist, rational fashion . . . .”78 But it is one thing for one to treat
those with whom one interacts in a rational fashion and another to have
preferences about the sorts of persons with whom one interacts. I can
imagine people who will treat those with whom they do interact in an
impersonal rational fashion, but who would prefer not to interact with
them for reasons that are not impersonal and rational. And it is by no
means clear that the world will be a better place when all those
preferences are put to the test of hyperrationality.

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
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Consider the preference for the beautiful. It is no doubt just as well
that antidiscrimination law has not yet treated the non-beautiful as a
suspect classification or as a disability that must be accommodated under
the A.D.A., although it has been argued that the A.D.A. should be
extended in precisely that way.79 Part of the story here is that the
inequalities attached to attractiveness are not as systemic or entrenched
as the inequalities of race. Moreover, it is difficult to imagine how we
might instantiate a nondiscriminatory principle without doing more harm
to those whose interests we were attempting to protect. Still, the
literature is replete with disparaging remarks about the preference for
“gaze objects” in positions such as food servers and flight attendants. Of
course, we are ambivalent about beauty. While we recognize its attraction,
we also endorse norms that diminish its importance; “beauty is only skin
deep,” “you can’t tell a book by its cover.” Yet the fact is that we are
inclined to reject the words of Kahlil Gibran: “Beauty is not in the face.
Beauty is a light in the heart.”80 I think that the preference for beauty is
an important counterexample to the case for hyperrationality in the market.
I have no doubt but that responding to this preference produces nondeserving losers and that it has decided negative externalities. At the
same time, I suspect that the preference can be frustrated only at
considerable cost and that we are well advised just to let it go.
C. Perfectionism
Kim Yuracko may disagree. In her book, Perfectionism and
Contemporary Feminist Values, and in a series of articles, Yuracko has
defended a perfectionist theory of, and at least some features of,
antidiscrimination law.81 Here I focus on her article, Private Nurses and
Playboy Bunnies: Explaining Permissible Sex Discrimination,82 in which
Yuracko seeks to explain and defend the willingness of courts to allow

79. See Note, Facial Discrimination: Extending Handicap Law to Employment
Discrimination on the Basis of Physical Appearance, 100 HARV. L. REV. 2035, 2035-36
(1987).
80. KAHLIL GIBRAN, THE EYE OF THE PROPHET 94 (Margaret Crosland trans.,
1995).
81. See KIMBERLY A. YURACKO, PERFECTIONISM AND CONTEMPORARY FEMINIST
VALUES (2003).
82. Yuracko, supra note 48.
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employers to exclude men from certain jobs but not others.83 She argues
that the best explanation is to be found in a perfectionist theory, which
argues that some choices and ways of life are substantively good
whereas others are bad.84
Now it is not always clear whether Yuracko is seeking to provide a
causal or descriptive explanation of court decisions as contrasted with a
normative justification of those decisions. When she asks “why do
courts distinguish between strip clubs and restaurants in cases where
both are seeking to satisfy customer desire for sexual titillation?”85 it
appears that she is asking a causal question, but there is little evidence
that individual judges were relying on anything remotely like her
perfectionist theory. If we recast the question in normative terms, we
can understand Yuracko as offering her versions of perfectionism as the
best justification for these decisions, whatever their motivation. Even
this is not quite right. I believe that Yuracko is best understood as offering a
justification for antidiscrimination law and not as a justification of a
particular application of the law. In any case, I want to ask whether her
version of perfectionism justifies the sorts of policies that the court has
upheld.
So interpreted, Yuracko seeks to justify antidiscrimination law in
terms of a customer-focused perfectionism and a worker-focused
perfectionism. On closer inspection, Yuracko actually offers two versions
of a customer-focused perfectionism: what might be called a self-worth
perfectionism and an offense-based perfectionism. A self-worth perfectionist
maintains that “government should encourage the values, activities, and
ends that are consistent with these better ways of life and discourage
those that are not,” and that it can promote this aim by respecting some
customer preferences and disrespecting others.86 From this perspective,
accommodating an elderly woman’s preference to shield her body from
exposure to males is a legitimate preference that overrides the interest
that males might have in working as a nurse. For one’s sense of privacy
is “integral to an individual’s conception of self and self-worth.”87 By
contrast, a male’s desire for sexual titillation is not “integral to an
individual’s conception of self worth” or, if it is, it should not be.
Because it is better for the character of the customer that he not be
titillated in this way, this preference cannot trump or override the interests
83. See id. For example, courts have allowed employers to exclude men from the
position of Playboy Bunnies and private nurses, but not others, such as flight attendants,
restaurant servers, and male prisons. Id. at 149.
84. See id. at 153.
85. Id. at 150.
86. Id. at 153.
87. Id.
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that prospective male employees might have for providing the relevant
service. Yuracko’s offense-based perfectionism maintains that whereas
we may allow workers to engage in sexual titillation where the customer
knowingly places himself in a position to be so titillated (as with
Playboy Bunnies or strippers), we may want to protect the sensibilities
of customers when they encounter women in mainstream businesses.88
We might ask two questions about these arguments. First, are they
really perfectionist? Second, do the arguments work? I believe that the
self-worth argument is plausible, but I am not sure that it is genuinely
perfectionist. On one view, a perfectionist policy seeks to advance what
is good for the targets of the policy as contrasted with the goodness of
the target. It is by no means clear that not allowing people to satisfy
their illegitimate preferences is good for them unless we assume that
such a policy will shape their character in morally desirable ways and
that having a better character is better for that person. With respect to
the second argument, even if we assume, I believe somewhat implausibly,
that people prefer to be shielded from “the jarring experience of having
sexuality foisted upon them,”89 this is an argument from something like
Feinberg’s Offense Principle rather than a form of perfectionism, unless
we supplement it with a distinction between the jarring experiences from
which we ought to protect people and those that do not deserve our
intervention.90 Moreover, if most people did prefer not to encounter
unexpected displays of other people’s sexuality, then we can expect the
market to respond without the need for government intervention.
Suppose, however, that more people enjoy being confronted with
sexuality in traditional business contacts than do not. Under these
conditions, it might be argued that the preferences of the “jarred” should
take priority over the preferences of the “non-jarred” because they are of
greater moral worth. But then the argument once again fails to represent
a traditional form of perfectionism, unless it is assumed that not
responding to a person’s illegitimate preference to be jarred is better for
that person than responding to it.

88. See id. at 201 (“When people go to strip clubs, they expect to see explicit
displays of sexuality, but when people walk onto airplanes or into hotel lobbies, they do
not. Prohibiting sexuality from creeping into these traditional businesses protects such
customers from the jarring experience of having sexuality foisted upon them.”).
89. Id.
90. See id.; see also JOEL FEINBERG, 2 MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW:
OFFENSE TO OTHERS 1 (1985).
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All that said, Yuracko’s principal line of argument appeals to workerbased perfectionism. Here, she is not so much interested in the
distinction between the privacy cases (nurses) and the sexual titillation
cases (Playboy Bunnies), but in the distinction between the pure sexual
titillation cases (Playboy Bunnies and strippers) and what she calls plussex cases, such as Hooters waitresses whose job is to serve food and
simultaneously act as a sexual gaze object for the customers.91 Yuracko
argues that when employers explicitly sexualize a job that is in essence a
non-sex job, this creates a role confusion for the employee (“Am I a gaze
object or a food server?”; “Am I a skilled flight attendant who can help
passengers escape in case of an accident or a target for male sexual
fantasy?”) and frustrates their intellectual development.92 Yuracko advances
an empirical argument and a moral argument. As a matter of empirical
psychology, she argues that plus-sex jobs are bad for the employees. As
a matter of morality, she argues that we should seek to promote the
employee’s intellectual development by prohibiting employees from defining
their jobs in ways that hinder that development.93 Yuracko’s empirical claim
may be correct, although the evidence she cites is decidedly underwhelming.
She cites a study of forty male and forty-two female undergraduates in
which the subjects were duped into putting on a sweater or a swim suit
and then asked to take a math test that was supposedly unrelated to the
study.94 The females in the swim suits underperformed the females in
the sweaters. Why? Because being placed in a revealing outfit caused
women to focus their mental energy on their body rather than on other
tasks, and this self-objectification can occur just from wearing certain
kinds of clothes even if they are not being viewed in those clothes.95
This is not a lot of evidence, although the principal psychological claim
may well be right. I suspect, however, that even when women are not
required to wear certain kinds of clothes, they are more concerned with
their appearance than men, perhaps because men are more concerned
with female appearance than women are concerned with male appearance.
Despite all the fretting about the fragile female psyche to the contrary
notwithstanding, the fact remains that females do better in school than
males—by a wide margin. Their self-objectification does not seem to
hinder their intellectual development. In general, I suspect that women are
more capable of handling the role confusion than Yuracko seems to
91. Yuracko, supra note 48, at 173.
92. Id. at 203-04.
93. See id. at 207.
94. Id. at 208 (citing Barbara Fredrickson et al., That Swimsuit Becomes You: Sex
Differences in Self-Objectification, Restrained Eating, and Math Performance, 75 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 269 (1998).
95. See id. at 209.
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think. My best guess is that many college students leave their jobs at
Hooters and go back to studying with full mental energy and with more
tips in their pockets than they would otherwise earn, having separated
many superficial males from their hard-earned dollars.
Let us grant Yuracko’s empirical claim. Should courts seek to promote
female intellectual development by prohibiting employers from defining
jobs in this way? First, I suspect that Yuracko vastly overestimates the
impact of antidiscrimination law in this area. I find it hard to believe her
claim that law firms and universities do not make sex appeal an explicit
requirement for positions because they are prohibited from doing so.96
More importantly, Yuracko does not confront the more obvious moral
objections to her worker-based perfectionism, which are no less important
for being relatively obvious. First, even if sex-plus jobs do impede a
woman’s intellectual development, it is by no means clear that all
reasonable persons must place such weight on the intellect. Yuracko
says that “courts may be in a better position than even women themselves to
weigh the social costs of women’s lost intellectual development,” but it
is not quite clear what she is claiming.97 If she is arguing that sex-plus
jobs have social costs or negative externalities, then courts may be better
positioned to weigh those costs than the individual employees themselves.
But that argument has nothing to do with perfectionism or the interests
of the employees. If she is claiming that courts are better positioned than
the employees to evaluate what is good for the employees themselves,
then the argument is quite problematic. I have no general objection to
paternalism when we have reason to think people are making a factual
error as to what advances their interests (and perhaps women do
empirically underestimate the effect of sex-plus work on their psyche),
but I think we must be much more cautious when we engage in moral
paternalism, when we believe that a person is not giving appropriate
weight to a value, be it safety, excitement, intellectual development, or
money. It is one thing to compel someone to receive a blood transfusion
when they wrongly believe it is likely to be infected with HIV. It is
another thing to compel someone to receive a blood transfusion when
their religious principles prohibit it.98
96. See id. at 211 (“The fact that such jobs do not exist is probably more a function
of the state of current antidiscrimination law than of their social inconceivability.”).
97. Id. at 206 n.218.
98. For example, the religious principles of Jehovah’s Witnesses prohibit them
from accepting blood transfusions.
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I am skeptical of perfectionism cum moral paternalism not because I
think that people cannot make mistakes about values and not because I
want to place “autonomy” as an inviolable moral principle. I think Jehovah’s
Witnesses are making a colossal mistake in refusing blood transfusions.
At the same time, I think that the range of reasonable judgments as to
what is best for a person is relatively large. Does Yuracko want to
compel the Jehovah’s Witness to receive a transfusion? If not, I think
she should be reluctant to interfere with a woman’s choice to suffer the
cramped intellectual development of a plus-sex job and to receive the
income she might thereby earn.
More importantly, we must remember that perfectionism is not just a
theory of objective value, although it presupposes such a view.
Perfectionism is a political theory that claims that it is permissible for
the state to use coercion to advance the excellence of its citizens. John
Stuart Mill is a perfectionist about value. He believes that some ways of
life are better than others. But, for at least two reasons, Mill is a nonperfectionist with respect to political theory. First, as a matter of
developmental psychology, Mill thinks that people will develop their
capacities best if they are left alone to make choices for themselves,
including bad choices, rather than being led to the good choices by the
state. Second, Mill is quite skeptical that society will generally make
better choices for its citizens than the citizens themselves.99 After producing
numerous arguments for his version of the harm principle, Mill famously
offers a probabilistic argument: “But the strongest of all the arguments
against the interference of the public with purely personal conduct, is
that when it does interfere, the odds are that it interferes wrongly, and in
the wrong place.”100 I do not claim here that we should regard the conditions
of employment as “purely personal conduct,” but Mill’s skepticism may
still apply. Yuracko’s perfectionism presupposes a high degree of confidence
that the state’s power will be exercised in ways that advance the interests
of women, and that is much more confidence than I can muster. None of
this denies the force of other arguments for the laws that Yuracko seeks
to defend, but before unleashing the various branches of our government
to do battle on behalf of any perfectionist vision, we had better be very
confident that they will exercise that power wisely. In antidiscrimination
law as elsewhere, a healthy liberal skepticism may be in order. Liberalism
as second-best may be the best we can do.

99.
(1859).
100.

980

See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 163 (George Routledge & Sons 1915)
Id. at 123.

